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ABSTWICT
Using an original data source, this paper investigates the circumstances under which fmns adopt computer
numericalcontrol (cNC), an impatant iype of flexible automadon which can significantly increase producti~lh.
productvarietyand quality. The paper shows that arms’-lengthsupplier/customer relationships are a significant
barrier to CNC adoption, even where CNC would improveefllciency. For f- where CNC would be efficient.
but who currentlyreceivelittlecommitmenthm theircustomers,an increase in contract length of one year would
increase the adoption rate by 30°/0.
These results have theoretical implications in two areas. FmL the paper integrates questions of approprkbilit~
into the technicalchange li~ by addingsupplierrelations as a determinant of technology adoption. Second.
the paper extends transaction-costanalysis,by relaxing the assumption that agents’private maximizing behavior
will ahvays produce organizational forms that maw social efficiency.
Manythanks to Albert O. Hirschman. Martin Feldstein, MaryellenKelley, Charles Sahel, Bo Carlsso~ Bennett
Harrisoru James D. Adams, Amresh Hanchate, Richard Pariiin and David I. Levine for comments: to Patrick
Cobum and Vitaliy Khizder for excellent research assistance: and to the SIoan Foundatio~ the Ameritech
Foundation. the Center for Regional Economic Issues at Case Western Reserve University, and the MIT
International Motor Vehicle Program for financial support.

An economy is not affected in any materml i~ayby new technolo~ until the use or o~~-nershipOrthat
technoiog IS\videspread.
Slonemmt( 1983. p.65)
B> not~ the tale of an invention made m the L’Sbut reaching its full potential oni> in o[iler courttr[es
is an oft-told one: it is true for both product innovations (such as the VCR. the micro~vave.and computer
memo~”). and organizational breakthroughs (such as Henry Fords imento~-reduction methods m-idDcmln~’s
statistical process control). Yet mother example is the case of programmable automation.
was invented in the US. but which has since diffused more widcl> in Europe and Japan.
This paper provides evidence that adversarial customer-supplier relationships are
a tcchnolog \\ hlch
a key fitctor m
explaining the low rates of adoption of programmable equipment in the US. The paper examines the impact
on adoption of computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools’ of the relationship bet~~een
components suppliers and theu customers in the automotive indust~.:
The paper is organized as follows. The first section reviews the literature to develop three
explanations of the determinants of technolog adoption: efficiency. market power. and active customer
commitment. The second section builds a model which includes each of the three explanations as special
cases. The third section applies the model to CNC. and the fourth describes the data source. a swey of
automoti~e suppliers which I conducted in 1989. and presents results t’romestimating the model. The
‘A computer numerically-controlled (CNC3 machine tool is controlled by a single dedicated minicomputer or
microcomputer.Computernumericalcontrol allows a machine tool to be programmed. in contrast to conventional mtichme
tools, utuch are operated by rnachkists who control the tool through the uw LJfgears and cams. CNC tools can sigruticanti>
increase productivity, quality, and product varie~.
[n a cmprehemive study of 2 I machining-intens~w industrws in the United States, Kelky and Brooks ( 19911
[’,I,III(I[hot[n 1987,only 11YO d all machine tools m use \\ere proyrmunuhle and that only 430/0of fm had e~en one
~~)ll\\>uLcr-cunwlledtool.ForJapan theycitestudiesshowingthat300/’of muchine tools in use in 1985 were programmable.
\Kclleyml Brooksestimatethis tigtae \vouldhave grmtn to W% by [987 ) EL@ustand Jacobsson ( 1988, p. 104) calcuk
Fo;1984k number of cornputer+.ontrolkd(both NC and CNC) muchme WA per employee in engineering industries. thev
tind the dmmy in Japan and Swedento be nearlv double hat oitie (JS. The t.iispantyin production is even greatff. by IWj
Japanese output ot.computer-controlled mackine tools was 10~imesthat of lhe US (Ray, 1989).
‘Mxhinc.tool adoption involves tlvo sets of cust(mwrkpplkr rcldtmnsilips: between the component-maker 2ntl the
In;ichine-t(wl vendor. und bc~~leen the automikr ontl k component-maker. This paper studies the second tylwL)(
re!ationslup: see Kelky and Brooks ( 199I) tbr a discusswn of the relutmnsiup betweenmanufacturersand rnachlIw-IIxd
vendors.
conclusion argues that bccausc of their effects on incentives to adopt new technology, supplier/customer
rclatlouships play a key role in economic development,
1. Models of technology adoption
Much of the economics literature on technology adoption follows the approach de~elopedby
?vlanstield ( 1968. 1989) in arguing that firms adopt new technologies based on their expected profits from
doing so. For example. Mansfield ( 1989) explains the difkion of industrial robots on the basis of
differences in firms’estimates of their own profitability of adoption. (Mansfield does not explore the
dctcmlinants of estimated profitabilih.) Below. I look at three major schools of thought about what might
determine estimated profitabili~. \
a. Efficienw. In a truiy seminal 1957 study of the diffusion of hybrid com in the United States, Gnliches. like
Mansfield. argues that technology adoption is related to profitability. However, Griliches’smeasures are more
closely related to the efficiency of adoption, which is not alwayscorrelated with the profitability of adoption
by a user. For example, he uses yield improvements achievablewith hybrids in an area as a proxy for hybrid
seeds’profitability to farmers. However, yield improvement affects the ~ producer and consumer surplus
wailable to be divided among farmers. seed companies, and consumers. Each group’sshare will not
automatically increase when total surplus increases.3
Many other studies of technology adoption have followedGriliches in assuming that a new
technolo~ will be adopted if and only if it leads to aa increase in total surplus. See for example the studies of
adoption of NC machine took’ done by Romeo ( 1975) and Globerman ( 1975), and Oster’s (1982) study of
‘Use0[hybrids changes the relative bargaining powa ot’farmers and seed compsrties. The reason is that once fanners
su Itch to hybrids, they lose the abilityto producetheirownseedfinmthepreviousyear’scrop, because the otTspringof
II}i-uidsckd are much lessproductivethannon-hybridizedcorn. Instead, farmers must buy seed every year bm oligopolistic
seed cumptmics (Berlan and Lewontin, 1986). This situation is sn example of Williamson’s (1985 p.63) “fundamental
II,ui+ml~tiun”, in which once agents invest in speetilc assets, they sre subject to being “heldup” by their suppliers for the
value of the asset-specltic rents.
‘NC ~nurnencd control) is an earlier version of CNC. in which instructions are conveyed to the tool by means of iIpaper
tape instead of a computer.
diffusion of the basic ox}gen furnace.
b. Market Po~~er.In contrast to the “efficiency”school discussed above. ability to appropriate profits pla>cd a
central role m the \~or~of Joseph Schu.mpeter(1950). In particular. he ar=izjcdthat high market share alloltcd
firms to be more in.no!ativc. because of their greater ability to reap pri~ate profit from their risk-taking
behavior. Et idence that market polver affects the technolo~ adoption decision is provided b> von Hippcl
(1988). tdlo finds in many industries that market share is a significant determinant of a firm’sdccislon to
adopt a new technology. HaMart and McDoiveil ( 1984 a and b) find that banks in more concentrated morkls
in the US are more likely to adopt automatic teller machines.while Espltia. Polo. and Saias ( 1991) find thx
speed of ATM adoption is maximized at intermediate levelsof concentration for Spanish banks.
c. Customer commitment. In the “market po~ver”tradition. relationships between customer and supplier firms
are impersonal and ann’s-length. In contrast. Ronald Dore (1983. 1986) has argued that one of the keys to
Japanese success has been their use of “relational contracting”. where “trading relations [are treated as]
particularistic personal relations“. in ~vhichboth parties have an obligation to maintain the stability of the
relationship. rather than deal with the firm that offers the best deal at the moment. Dore argues that the
greater securih and trust involved in such relations leads to more in~estment and a more rapid flow of
information ( 1983. pp.464.475).
E\idcnce for this approach is provided by Kelley( 1993). Nho his that fmns ~~hosecustomers
provide them Ivith technical information are more likely to adopt programmable automation. including CYC.
Lane ( !991 ) sho~vsthat US coal companies which are vertically integrated with their customers are more
Iikcly to adopt continuous mining machines. The MIT Commission on Industrial Productivity (Dertouzos.
Lester. and Soiow. 1989) and Piore and Sahel ( 1984) hare both pointed to adversarial supplier/customer
relationships m a factor ~vhichhas hindered US competiti~eness. Carisson and Jacobsson ( 1994) explain the
high rate of adoption of flexible automation by Strcdish firms as in part due to close supplier/customer
Iinklgcs.
Oliver Williamson ( 1975. 1985) look at how the nature of contracts between firms affects their
ln~cstment In specific assets. While Williamson does not explicitly consider the determin~ts of tech.nolog
adoption. his theo~ can be readily applied to the case of investment in a specific asset tvhich embodies nel~
tcchnolog \Villiamson points out that conditions such as asset specifici~. bounded rationali~. uncertain:.
and opportunism lead to increases in the costs of c~ing out transactions using markets. These costs ma! bc
high enough to discourage parties whose relationship is governedby a market from making efficient
in~estments.
For example. Monteterde and Teece ( 1982) show that automakers tend to vertic~lly integrate the
production of parts characterized by asset specifici~. The authors explain this preference for vertical
integration on the basis of the difficulty of designing the complex contingent contracts necess~ to carq out
an arrns’-length markt transaction. If there arises a situation unforeseen by the contract, a party ~~hichhas
invested in an asset ~vhichis specific to another firm is wlnerrible to a “hold-up”, in which the other fm
reneges on its promise to provide a competitive returrt, since the investment is now Sunk.s
Transaction-cost theorists assume that although it is theoretically possible that contracting
arrangements ~villdeter investment. institutional arrangements will in practice adjust so that parties have the
incenti~e to invest efficiently. In the case above. Monteverdeand Teece aw.une that fms choose the le~elof
Jertical integration so as to produce the socially-efficientamount of asset specificity.6That is. \vhilemarkets
ma>’fail. o~erall economic organization does not.
‘A correlationbetweenassetspecificity and vertical intqration is also found in econometric work by Joskow ( 1985),
ml Ldw-rnarr (199 I). Acorrelationbetweenassetspedcity and conkact length or other safeguards is repofied by Joskow
I,i‘)s7I.undHeIdeand John ( 19823).These authorsinterpret their tiiings as support for the transaction-cost prediction that
m exogenouslevelofassetspecificity leads to modifications in governance mechanisms.
% contras~Crandall(1968)arguesthat [JS automakerschose inefficientlyhighlevelsot’assetspecificiq,soas to reduce
I.Ixsw (Jt’themarlw[fora giventypeoi replacementpart. By designing a Chevrolet alternator to be incompatible \vith a
Pontiac alkmalor, for example, General Motorscould decrease tbe likelihood that an independent firm could enter the
rcpkcnkmt ultcmatormarketat ctlicwntscale.
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2. A Model of Supplier Relations and Investment -
[n this section. I develop a model Jvhichcontains as specml cases each of the three h!~otheses ~bouL
technoloq adoption discussed abo~c.
Consider first a discrete version of the model in Tirole ( 1988. pp,22-7). A customer and J suppllcr
are considering a joint project which requires the supplier to invest an amount [ in period 1. and u hlch In
period 2 has Ialue v to the customer and production cost c for the supplier. The supplier’s ml cstment [S
specific to the customer and is ~voddess after period 2: I, v. imd c are common knowledge and arc net of
opportunity costs. If the parties do not sgn an agreement in period 1but the supplier invests an}~~a?. then m
period 2 the gains from trade are v-c. since the supplier’s investment is sunk. Suppose the customer and the
supplier engage in Nash bargaining in period 2. Then the supplier’sprofit from the project is
(1) Tr’=a(v-c) -l.
where a is the supplier’s share of the gain from trade. A profit-maximizing supplier lvill invest if
(2) a (v -c)> I.
In contrast. it is socially optimal to invest as long as
(3) V- C>I.
Since a < = 1. the supplier will not invest in some projects Nhich arc socially optimal. [n contrast. If the
supplier and the customer sign a long-term contract in period I (before the supplier invests). the supplier 11III
invest as long as
(4) #=cz(v-c-1)>0,
\vhich is optimal because(4) is satisfied if~d oniy if G) is satisfied.
In the case of the short-term contract. the supplier underin~ests because it bears all of the costs of the
investment. but receives only a of the returns In contrast- under a Iong-term contract the supplier pays a of
the costs and receives a of the returns. In the general case. the supplier receives a of the benefits and pays a
different proportion (y) of the costs:
(j)n’=a(v-c)-yl.
Why would a customer not offer a contract such that a = y if this arrangement is necess~ for
efficient m~estrnent? One reason is that a customer ~vitholigopoly rents may prefer inefficient short-tetm
supplier rekmonshlps to Iong-temncontracts. if a long-term contract makes it possible for the supplier to gmn
a larger share of the oligopoly rents.
We can extend the model above to show conditions under which bargaining-power considerations
preclude efficient contracts.- Suppose the customer reaps oligopoly rents, F, in its futal-product market.
Suppose also that the customer incurs a cost of s~vitchingGomone supplier to another.s
As long as the switching costs are greater than zero, the customer must give the supplier access to a
share of its oligopoly rents if a long-term contract is signed. The reason is that the supplier can now-holdup
the customer if unforeseen contingencies arise during the contract period. For example, if the customer wants
to change the specifications of the supplier’s component (a common occurrence in the auto industry), the
suppIiercan refuse to renegotiate the agreement unless it is paid handsomely for its trouble. The customer
could compensate for this later loss of bargaining power by requiring the supplier to bid for the right to
obtain a long-term contract. However. I show below that in the presence of supplier uncertainty about the size
of the oligopoly rents. there may be no mutually-acceptable bid due to adverse selection.
The model has two time periods, In the auction periocLthe customer accepts bids for the right to a
long-term contract. [f agreement is reached. the supplier makes the investment and the patties divide the
mutual gain (v-c-1)as well as the customer’soligopoly ren~ F. In the auction period. we treat the sharing
parameters. a, and w,, as fixed. [n the production period which follows. we determine a endogenously.
‘This section dralvs on Helper and Levine (1992).
8E\anlpks of switching costs would be the expenses of moving customer-owned tooling fYomone supplier to anothec
establishing communications link trainingsuppliersto use thecustomer’sproceduresfor&ks suchas quali@ingtirrns
u ho supplvequipmentandmaterials,or documentingquality-assurancefforts.Thesecostsmaybe quitelow.However,
M shmvnklmr. s~vitchmgcostsrise if thecustomersips a long-termcontractwiththesupplier.
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Assume the customer first privately obsenes F. ind then receives bids from suppliers for a contract
under \\ hich the customer pays ( I-y) of the investment cost.~ Suppose that conditions are such that suppliers
\!ould not invest in the absence of a long-term contract’”.The customer should accept a bid B if
(6)(1 -~l)(F-~-c) -(1-y )I+B>(l-a,)F.
~ihere( l-al) [s the customer’s share of joint profits if a long-term a~eement ISreached. and ( 1-a, ) K its share
if agreement is not reached. .ksurne F is uniforml~distributed bet~~cenOand FmaxAlthough the supplier
obsemes F after the auction period. we assume that F cannot be verified bv the coutts. Thus. contracts cannot
be contingent on F. ‘1
If many suppliers bid for the contract. then competition ~vdldrive their expected profits from the
irnestment to zero:
(7) E {al (FIBacceP~~+v-c)-y I) -B} =E {a, Flawc.P[~}
Howe~er. the customer will not accept the supplier’s bid unless (6) is satisfied. even if the relationship-
specitic rents are positive. The expected value of F given that the bid is accepted is
(8) E(Fla ~~~~~ = E (Fl(l-a,)F < (l-czI)(F + v-c)-(1-y[) * B. or
(9) WIB,ccw~,J ‘[(1 -~,)(v-c) -(l-Y)I + B]/2(a,- a,).
Note thatsuppliers’bids could be paid in kind. as m an otkr O(“tiree”product design. Note also that if the supplier hus
sutiicient market poww (a, is high enough). the customer u dl face swtchmg costs high enough to protect the suppller’s
investment even tvlthout a Iong-temttcontract.
‘That is, suppose that a,(v-c+F)-I< a~. [t is straightforwardtoshowthat Ifthesupplierwould invest without a kmg-
tcnn contract. the cwstomercannot increase its protits by otknng a lung-term contract.
‘iAthwrse selection precludesmanyetlicient barguns under more general assumptions concerning the distnbutwn d
F. A umtomndisttibtttion implies that k absolute level ut’uncertain about the level of increasesas F.u increases. This
lSintuiu~elyplausible. since the absolute level uf uncertainty w-rounding C.hqAer’s product market rents is less than that
surroundingGMs. As HelpuTandLeiine(1992)show,F und(v-c-[)neednotbe not additne fortheadverse-selccuonresult
to hold.
tn a repeated game, the supplier would o~er time learn aboutthecustomer’sprcductmarketrents,alleviatingthe
od~erse-wlectmnproblem.On theotherhandthisknotiledgeis valuableand the rents are uncertain. making the value uf
dw imtid contracteven more uncettain.Thisetkt increases the severity O(the initial adverse-selection problem. Therefore.
placing the model in a repeated-game context \vould not change the baste result that adverse selectionprecludes some
etlicient transactions.
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Substituting (9) into (7) gi~es
(10) B ‘(i+~,) (~-C)-(l+y)l.
The probability that the customer uill accept this bid is
(ll)P=Pr [B-(l-al) (F-\-c) -./l> (a, )F],oror
(12) P = 2(v-c-1)/(a,-a,) F.,~,.
If the relationship-specific rents are positi~e but small relative to the maximum final-product market rent F7,&,
or the increase in the supplier’s bargaining share (a, - u ~, there is w bid \vhich is acceptable to both [he
supplier and the buyer. and investment Jvdlbe inefficiently low,’2
The auction stage took the bargaining power parameters a, and al as given. Following Shaked and
Sutton ( 1984). we derive et, and u, as the outcome of a noncooperative game that is played over real time
during the production stage after the auction. The supplier obsetves F in the production period, so
information is complete and symmetric. When the production period begins. the hvo players alternate in
proposing how to divide the total rents horn the relationship. The other player may respond by either
accepting the offer or making a counteroffer in the next period In order to eliminate fwst-moveradvantages.
u c examine equilibrium as the time behveen successive offers approaches zero. Bargaining is costiy, in the
sense that the present value of the surplus to be divided ftis by the factor (1-a) in each period th~t a~cm~m
rate of decline of the surplus which occurs Kthe piayas twcdevotistg energy to k@.ming and t.hwefm are
not paying full attention to produstis. As=une that the Customeris locked into bargaining tvith the suppkr K
chose in the auction stage for either I periods (in the case of a long-term contract) ors pericds (if no long-term
ccmtractis signed). Afler the lock-in period is over, the customer obtains the input at cost C (either by
ruaking th~nart in-house. buying it on an arm’s-lengthmarkeg or buying it flom another long-term supplier
._—
I:Th~ ~~ tit ‘JC& omer who receives oligopolymrentswill rejeet some eff;cient contracts is robust to a varie~ of
qwciticatiom~kl~ * nam.t’ k suppliers.Forex~pk, he amI’s-lengthmarket for inputs may be pert”kctlycompetitive
~ltnplyinga,= o). uc ~%@icrs ‘“wbargain unc nL a [imc
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who must rapidly start up production).
Using backward induction. Shaiied and Sutton ( 1984) shoit that this game has a umque perfect
equdibriu.m. in which
(13) Tf=cq(F+ v-c-l)
( 1~) n’= ( l-~,) (F + ~-c-i). where
(15) U, =c+(l-6)( 1-5’’) d/(l-i5’).
Thus. ( 13) and ( 14) describe the division of surplus assumed m the auction stage above. i~hcre rr~is the
purchaser profit. and t = (1.s).By inspection. we can see that 1> s implies al > a,. Thus. the longer the
customer is locked into bargaining with a particular supplier (e.g.. the longer the customer’scontract wlth the
supplier). the greater the supplier’s share of the surplus.
3. Investment in CNC and Customer/Supplier Relations
Compared to con~entional general-purpose machines. CNC offers greater labor productivih (since
time spent repositioning the Ivorkpiece for different passes is greatly reduced), greater conformance qualih.
and the abilih to machine more complicated parts than a skilled machinist could. Compared with dedicated
equipment. CNC offers faster set-ups. since only the program has to be changed--hard~vareis not affected.
(Romeo. 1975: Noori. 1990. pp.24-5: Kelley and Brooks. 1991.)
CNC machines ha~e been commerciall~ a~ailable since the mid- 1970s. However. a comprehensiw
1987 suney (Kellq and Brooks. 1991) of US metal-working establishments found that only 43’% of plants
had e~en one computer-controlled machine tool. and that less than 1l% of the stock of machine tools in use
\vas computer-controlled.
Wily have adoption levels been so low’?Belot~.1show that CNC investment in the auto indust.q tits
the model of section 2 in that the investment is spccifit. and auto suppliers have the ability to holdup Lhcir
customers.
EJcn though CNC equipment itself is general-purpose. if a firm or division has few mariwts. cm}
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addition to its fixed capital increases the firm’svulnerability to a “hold-up”. To see this. suppose the firm c~n
nclther mstarttaneously generate new customers nor instantaneously sell and buy back its equipment to suit ItS
Ie\ei of demand. Under these conditions. If one of the firm’smajor customers stops (or threatens to stop)
bu! Ing from it. the firm’slosses will increasewith the levelof its fixed costs. ‘3
For example. according to Jack Reilly. CEO of Temeco Automotive (a subsidi~ of a large.
multinational firm). a five-year contract tvith Ford was crucial to Tenneco’sdecision to equip its exhaust-
s}stcm production facilities tvith CNC machines. The reason was that Temeco was um~illing to incur the nsk
of having such high fixed costs without some level of guaranteed demand. since the fm could not
instantaneously redeploy all its equipment were it to lose Ford as a customer,1d In contrast is a small Indiana
stamping supplier I visited in 1989. According to the sales manager. the fum’s role was “to keep the other
suppliers honest”: its contracts were at most one year long. Although the plant had a small tool room. the
investment required to buy a CNC machine ~vasout of the question: it took hvo years of scrounging for the
firm to come up \vith the few thousand dollars necessary to hrnish a lunch room for the workers, so the! no
longer had to eat at their machines (intemiew. July 1989).
An investment in CNC is large. so the increased vulnerability to hold-up is significant. First. the
machines themselves are expensive. Noori(1990,p.25) estimates that conventional machine tools cost $ i0,000 to
$30.000. \vhile NC costs $80.000 to !$150,000 and CNC costs $250,000 to $1,000,000. Using conventional
‘The president of a small auto-parts tii made an analogy to the situation of an economist who goes into debt to take a
mathematics course. Although math skills are generaL tlteydon’t allow the economist to teach in another field such as
Qccoun[ing.and tk z &bt makes her mm-evulnerable to bankruptcy should the market for economists shrink (in[emiew
ii IdI Gerald F%- Joqh PollakInc., July 1995).
‘% return tbr t.k contrwx Tennecoagreedto5’%annualpricereductions. Even though Tenneco’sannual volume of most
t)1”[Iw~dlawtSVstemsitmakesishigh(inthetensofthousands),thefm preferredto producethesepartsusingCNC ra[her
I-kII[LVdOUtO&tiOnfm=IXtd ~ : 1)abilityto machine more @mplex parts, 2) faster machining time per piece. and
~) faster time to change over to another model. The latter consideration was important because of the need to produce in
smallbatches,due to li-equentengineering changes and the tenets of the just-in-time philosophy (interviews, October 1988
ond October 1989). For these reasons, CNC is quite applicable in the auto indusq for producing parts its use is by no
means iinutedto 100Iand die shops. (Interviews with Daniel D. LuriL Director of the Pdormance BenchmarkingSen’ice.
[nclustnalTcchnolow Institute.AnnArborML March 1989 and September 1995. Luria advises Michigan fimns(mostly
uuto suppliers)on appropriateuseof advancedtechnoiow.)
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accounting methods. which do not take into accourtt the complementarities described below. the pa: back
period is likely to be at least ten }ears ( Noori. 1990).
Second. the firm must make other irn”estmcntsto make the equipment investment pa~ off. CNC
requires emplo}ees to hme different skills--programming instead of manual dextenv Therefore. CXC
programmers must either be hired [\fhich means the firm must search for personnel in a different labor
market from that which it is used to). or trained (\rhich means the firm recurs trmning expenses. and 10SMCk
se~ices of its skilled machinists during the training period).
Moreover. profitable use of CNC and other q-pes of flewble automation requires a different
operations strategy. one which aims to create a “just-in-time”production en~ironment of small batch wzes
and pressure for continuous impro~ement.Concomitantly. firms must change their marketing strate~:
salespeople must learn a great deal about customers’ needs. so that they can sell CNC’Scapabilities for
product modification and customization.’S That is. investments in CNC are complementa~ ~vithinvestments
in many other areas of the fm. in the sense of Mihgromand Roberts (1992. p.543). The result is that e~en If
the senices of CNC-trained machinists could be bought and sold on an wrn’s-lengthmarket. the firm ~vould
still need to make nonredeployable investments in coordinating their capabilities ~vithother parts of the
organization. such as the marketing and production control departments
These expenditures make the firm’s fixed costs much higher than they were with conventional
machine took. These fixed costs mean that even though CNC incrcmes a firm’sflexibility by increasing the
range of products it can offer. it also increases a firm’sexposure to risk 1s
How can relationships ;vith customers improve the prospects for CNC adoption’? The supplier needs
“The preceding paragraphs are based on discussion with managers and v.’orkersat metalworking tirms. and Hannah
R&titI.formerlyotthe MachineAcUonProj~ a technicalassistaxe agency in Sprin@ield, MA. See also Kclleyand Brooks
(1991).
‘Vhese tirms are quatedependent on just a few cmtomers. The average fum in my sample sells over 60% of its output
to the mxo industry (-IO%sell over 8 I% of their output to the automakers). Since the Japanese automakers Formeda
negligiblepatt of the salesot’mostautosuppliers in the [IS m 1989, loss of one of the Big Three automakers as a customer
would mean at least a 20°/0 loss of Ax.
12
some assurance that customers will continue to purchase its products at a remunerative price for some length
of [illle. Sothat it can reap at least a martiet rate of return on its investment. Customers can provide this
commitment in several ways. including financial ties such as equity investment or long-term loans: long-tern
contmcts: or by demonstration of a concern for its reputation for fair dealing. Commitment can also be
protlded involuntarily. m ~vhena customer faces an oligopolistic supply indust~. 1”
4. \lethods
We can use the model in section 2 to derive an estimating equation. Suppose that (v-c). the change m
production cost associated with investing in CNC, is measured with error u,,which is IN(O.6‘). and is
uncomclated with the disturbance of F. the customer’s final-product market rent. Then the probability that
the supplier tvill invest is
(16) Pr(CNC=l) =j’.<.OPr (a, (v-c +u)>y I)* Pdy, where
( 17) P = 2(v-c-1)/(a,-a,) F-.
That is. for any proportion y of the investment cost to be paid by the customer, the suppliers willingness to
in~est depends on the probability that the investment will be profitable times the probability (P) that it J~ill
obtain a contract that pays y of the cost. Summing over the possible values of y gives the overall probabiliq
that supplier l~ill in~est. We interpret y = 1 as the case where no agreement is reached on a contract which
\tould require the customer to pay for any part of the investment. In this case therefore, a, = a,.
Equation ( 16)contains as special cases each of the technology-adoption models discussed in section 1. This
formulation suggests the following h~~otheses:
.4. The suodier is more Iikelv to invest in CNC if the efflciencv of CNC investment (v-c-I) is
‘“Theargumentis similar to Williamson’sdiscussion ot’“dedicatedassets”.whichare “discrete additions to generalized
capucitywhich Nould not be put in place but for the prospect of selling a largeamountofproductto a particularcustomer
PrcmiMIIEiemunut.ionof the contract by the buyer would leave the supplier with a large overhang ot’capaci~ that could be
di~posed t)fmdy at distress prices.” ( I985. p.I94)
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~ ASdiscussed m section 1.efficiency-based models-oftechnology adoption assume that difficulties In
distributing gains from trade do not impede adoption. This ISequivalent to assuming IX,=’{in ( 16).
CNC’Soperotmg-cosi crdwntcr$qe(v-c) depends on:
Wa~es of Production uorkcrs (HNVAGE).Since CNC machines w-efaster than general-purpose cqwpmtnt.
the rctum on mvcstment increases J\ith the cost of labor.
Techmcal comulex]h of suptilier’smoduct (COMPLE.X).Since CNC tools can machme some parts [n~!o!s
which conventional machine tools camot (for example. CNC can perform operations on multiple axesj. Lh]s
variable should enter positively.
Production lot size (BATCH) CNC is most effecuve at runs which are long enough to jusufi the fixed COS[
of wtitirtg a program (usually just a few parts). but not so long as to justifi the installation of dedicated
equipment. Since the firms in my sample suppl> production parts (not protoh~es) to the auto mdust~. their
volumes are large enough to meet the Iotverthreshold. Thus. BATCH should enter negativel~. (That is. the
distribution of BATCH in my sample is truncated at the lower end.)
Firm sales (SALES). This variable proxies for tit-m-leveleconomies of scale in management. since in the
absence of strong extra-firm institutions such as close relationships ~vithcustomers or government agencies. a
firm must rely on internal resources to make the organizational changes necessary to protitabl~ adopt CXC ‘
The ~tiable also proxies for economies of scale in marketing: equipment ~endors have to pa! fewer ~isits
“If one expects CNC use to be distributed uruformly across the popuhmon of machine tools, then tirms i~lth more
machine tools should be more likely to have one Of tlwrn he compilter-c~lntroiled.To the extent that z tirrn’s sales are
correlatwl \rith its numberof machineteds, the sales vantibk :s picking up only this scale factor. and does not contm
IIILumntionabouteconomiesot scale.However,the salesdata ISn~ pertectly correlated with number of machine tools. since
large!“ms do not aluays have lots of mitchine toois--theu primap production acttvity may be something other than mwd-
cutting, such as forging or assembly. (Even If they are engaged in metal-wttmg, long production runs may make tiwi
automation a cost-etkctive alternative to both CNC and conventwnal machme tools (Chrlsson and Taymaz, 1994) J [n
addition.the high fLxedcostsofCNCadopuoncasts doubt upon rhe hypothesis O(uni~omnadoption across all sizes O(tinns
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per machine sold.’9
CN(””’siwesttnent cost (I) depends on:
Age of fh-n-tOiEIV). New firms (those that entered the original-equipment auto market after 1983) are Iikel>
to hale bought equipment recently, Because new equipment is more [ike!yto embody new technolog (Dm Id.
I969) nel~ firms face a lower cost of in\esting in CNC.
Skill at introducing entirelv new mocesses (HISKILLJ.Firms which rate themselves tigh on this dimension
should have a lo~vercost of implementing CNC. so they should be more hkely to adopt.
B. The supplier will be more likely to invest in CNC if it has high bargaining power (a,)
Authors such as Schumpeter ( 1950) argue that a firm’s imovative behavior is affected by the sh~e of the
gains from trade the supplier can appropriate. as well as by efficiency concerns. However, these authors focus
on market power as the k~ determinant of appropriability. They do not allow for the possibility that deals
beh~een indi~idual suppliers and customers could resolve these problems. Implicitly they assume lI=O in
(16), Here. a, depends on:
Stumlier’s market share (SHARE). W%ena flu-mhas a higher market share, its customer will have fe~ver
altema[i~e sources of supply. so the firm can bargain for a bigger share of the benefits horn CNC adoption
Sucmlier’sDercentof sales to auto indusm (AUTOI measures the extent of a fro’s dependence onjust three
customers--the US-owned automakers~”.A high value of AUTO means a fwmhas few alternative sources of
demand. so that the firm is less likely to be able to replace lost orders quickly. Therefore, this variable should
1101c a neyttive impact on the probttbiiiy of CNC adoption.
‘“GnlIches( 1957)givesa similarrationaleforhis h}~thesis that areas with larger farms were faster to adopt hybrid corn.
Ho\ve\er. thisvariablecouldalsobe includedin the supplier relations categoq+,because there exist institutional structures
underwhich dis variable wouldnotbe significant:cooperativesof smallfmns,wherevendorscouldmake one sales pitch
m a group ot’cumpames. or government technical assistance programs targeted at smaUfm.
“TeI\ US-ouned tirmshad signitican[business with Japanese-owned automakers in 1989. Japanese transplant suppliers
(ICSSthan 12%ot’tie sample}did not *I1 to a sigruticantlyhigher number of automakers than their US-owned countwpafls.
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C. .4 supplier will be more likely to invest in CNC if it has a high probability of active
commitment (P) from an individual customer.:! This corrumtment ISmeasured b}:
contract length (CONTRACT). .4 longer contract gl~es the firm a longer plcmnmg horizon. Important because
of CNC’S long pa>bctck period and ties to other assets that are specific to just a fmvcustomers, Other”things
equal. a longer contract increases the probabilih that the customer IIIll pa} I propomon greater than zero of
the investment cost.
Equations ( 16) and ( 17) provide three I~aysto test the “acti~e corrumtment”h~-pothesls.First. [
estimate a probit equation using contract length as a proxy for P. Second. [ estimate ( 17) and ( 18) as a
recursive system. Finally, I estimate (17) explicitly. using grid search to maximize the likehhood. [nte=watmg
(17), the probability that CNC= I is
(19) P [1+ (a/I)ht ((1 + exp (-v+e))/(l+exp( (l/a)-v+cj)]
D. A customer will be more likely to accept a suppliers bid for a long-term contract (P will be
higher) if its final product market rents are low. [n equation ( 18). a higher value of FWXreduces the ~alue
of P. because the customer ~vantsto protect its ftnal-product market rents from the possibilih of hold-up b>
suppliers. Ho\\ever. applying Schumpeterian reasoning to automakers as ~vellas their suppliers. one sees that
if profits are too IOJV.the automaker-s ability to credibly commit to pa>mg a high proportion of the cost of
investing in the future \sill be reduced. Thus, \ve predict :
Customer’s maximum return on assets, 1970-1989 (CROA) should enter the contract equation pos[ti~el~.
u bile the square of this variable (CROASQ) should enter negati~el}.
21Institutional factors other than customer/supplier relationships are otten Important in determining ~doption rates. For
example. Carlsscm and .lacobsson ( 1994) argue that adoption rates are determined by the entre “technological systcm”.
Inducing state-sponsored“bridginginstitutions”,and a critical mass of using and supplying tii (See also Carlsson. 1995).
Kclleyand Brooks (199 I) show that the internal urganizaticmof the tirm including the labor-management relationship. is
also important. In this paper I will I-&us on customer/supplier relationships. I take into account internal orgamntlon
indirecdy,in the sense that the need to change it {as described in wc[ion 2) adds to [he cost of CNC adoption and therefore
to the advantagesOFcustomer comrmtnwnt. In theUS uuto indusW,bridgingrestitutionswhichu’ould provide asswtancc
in adopongCNChavebeen largely absent.
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5. Data
A 1989 s~ey of automoti~e suppliers that I conducted provides cmoppomnity to test the
h! pOdICSCS stated abo~e. The sunc~”iwtsconducted under the sponsorship of the [ntemational Motor Vehicle
Program at NIIT The surve~ questiomaire was based on indepth mtervie~vs\vlth almost one hundred
managers and workers at auto assemblers and their suppliers.
In spring 1989. a swey tvas mailed to every automotive supplier and automaker component
ch~isionnamed on the following lists: (1) the 1989 Elm Guide to Automotive Sourcinz in the United States.
and (2) members of the Motor and Equipment Manufacturers’Association who sell components directl~ to
the automakers. Thus. the smey was mailed to virtually ewry f~st-tier supplier to manufacturers of cars and
light trucks in the United States. The target respondent was the divisional director of marketing at
independent firms. and the divisional business manager or director of strategic planning at automaker
components divisions. I seIected these individuals based on information gathered ilom field intewiews that
they tvould have the broadest knowledge about both custotna relationships and about their firms’products
;I]ldprocesses. These individuals had a great deal of experience in the industry; they had been with their firm
for a median of 9 ~ears. and in the auto indushy for 11.
Because many companies supply their customers with several different ~~es of products. and their
rel~ticmships~~ith their customers differ by product. respondents we asked to am’er tie swv for O=
customer using w product tvhich ~vas~-picalof their company’soutput. In order to presene confidentiality
and to minimize the time required to till out the survey, respondents were not asked to provide exact data on
their firm’s sales. etc. but rather to check boxes indicating ranges.
The response was double the norm for business surveys: 499 filled-out questionnaires were received.
fo~a response rate of 47’!40.Furthermore. responses from the four major groups who received the suw--
automaker components divisions. Japanese-owned frets. MEMA members (who tend to be small and
medium-sizcd independent firms). and large independent fro--were close to their proportions in the
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population,
The dependent varmble “CNC adoption” lt as onc If the business umt had at least one CNC [nacilInc
making the product for tvhich the swey \Yas filled out. m-idzero othcnt Ise Business units for ~rhlchthe
respondent said that the technology Jvasnot ttpplicable or that the> didn’t knou were excluded from the
sample.:2 Table 1 describes the variables: table 2 provides summa~ stmstlcs.:~
The profit data for the three US automakers comes &omCOllP USTAT: return on mscts was
calculated as operating income/fixed assets for each of the years 1970-89, I obtained similar data for
Japanese automakers. thanks to Mamin Liebennan of UCLA.
6. Results
Table 3 shows support for all three h}Totheses in section 4. firms are more likel> to adopt CYC the
higher the efficien~ of CNC for their product. the greater their market potver. and the more customer
cortunitment they receite. Maximizing the likelihood function implied by (19) yielded similar results. as
shown in Table 5. Howe\er. this technique did not produce a significant improvement in the log likelihood.
and the results are difflcuh to interpret. so the rest of the discussion will focus on the probit results,
Column 3 of table 3 shows that efficiency. market polver. and acti~ecommitment are dl important
determinants of CNC adoption. In particular. the active commitment Jmable CONTRACT is siqificant at
better than the 1% level. As the first two columns of the table shol~. [he impact of the efficiency and market
power variables does not change if these are considered separately from the active commitment variables
The McKelvcy-Zavoina pseudo-R2 for the “active commitment” model is .59.
u In the reds repwted below, 213 respondentswere excluded because they did not know about the tectrnolo~. thought
It was inapplicable to their business, or (in a & cases) had missing data. I also anahzed a data set in tvhich an wto
technolo~ expert judged that for thirty of these tirms. CNC is indeed appiicoble to the manufacture of the product these
respondents imlicatal w’astypical of their business. The results tiwid]models utre not sigmticantly tlitlknt for this da[u
~c!dmnli~rkit reported.except that the uvwall tit Nas not quite as good. Thanks to Daniel Luria. Senior Research Sctentlst
at [he Industrml Technolos Institute in AnnArbor MI. for evaluating CNC applicability.
‘][n se~eral cases [ transfomned variables which originally had multiple levels into dummies. The rationale IS[hut
respondents are more likely to be able to sort themselves accurately into tu’o -groups(high id low’sl.alltit adopting ncti
process technolow. for example), than into tive. This procedure did not materially affect the results.
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One explanation for these results is that commitm~ntdoes not cause CNC adoption: instead. both
CYC adoption and commitment are dri~cn by a common third factor. such as being a “good”supplier. [n
table 3 Ivehime controlled for this posslbilih by including the ~ariable “HISKILL”. which measures the
supplier’s skdl at introducing cntirel} new processes.
However. it may be objected that this skill ISso imperfectlymeasured that the commitment \ cmablcs
are picking up some of the taricmce that ~~ouldbe attributed to a properly measured skill iwiable, A c!oser
look at Table 3 provides one anslver to this objection: the coefficient on HISKILL actually rises when
commitment tm-iables are included. [f the commitment variables \vere merely proxies for unmeasured skill.
then their omission should cause the coefficient on HISKILL to jump.
Table 4 provides more etidence that the commitment variables do have an impact on investment
independent of their comection Jvithefficiency. The fiist column presents estimates of CONTRACT using a
linearized ~ersion of equation ( 18). ~vherea,, the supplier’sbargaining share with a long-term contract. is
treated as a constant. Both CROA and CROASQ are significant in this equation. This result is consistent
l~ith the h~~othesis that customers are motivated not only by efficiency criteria in offering contracts to their
suppliers. but also by concerns to protect their fiial-product market rents. These results are robust to a \ arie~
of specifications: using the average return on assets (rather than the maximum); omitting outliers (Toyota
Ilad on a~erage return on assets of 40% and a maximum retmrnof 65?/o);using customer dummies rather than
customer ROA: and including dummies for Japanese-owned and automaker-owned supplier plants.
I then calculate CONTRACT (EST) by subtracting out that part of the variance of CONTEL4CTdue
to the ctTiciencyvariables. Even after adjusting the standard errors, CONTRACT (EST) remains highly
significant. again indicating that contract len@h is not just a proxy for unobserved variables measuring the
efficiency of CNC adoption.
These results are also robust. In particular. controls for vertical integration are not statistically
significant. .In transaction-cost models. integration is an organizational form which prevents “hold-ups”
19
~vtuchcan occur where specific assets and UrtcertainE/cornplexlh mc present. In the ctment framework.
integration might be interpreted as a measure of customer commitment. since in practice. it holl~-oi~ncd
divisions are hard for corporations to divest (Helper. [99 lb ~ Holfe~cr. VI is not sl~lficant. irith or u Ithout
\ariabics it hich might bc correlated Iwth ~erticd integration (?JE\V..\UTO. and CO~lpLEX):’
For those uneasy w’ithsubjective evalwmons. it ISperhaps comforting to note that on]: t\\o of lhc
variables (CO MPLE.X m-idHIS KILL) are subjectnel}” measured. LeaI ins them out has no impact on the
result that market power and active customer commitment are correlated u lth CNC adoption.
7. Conclusion
These results allotv us to reject the null h~-pothesisthat relationships bet~~eensuppliers and their
customers do not hale an important impact on suppliers’decision to ln~est In flexible aulomatlon, The
“market potver” and “active commitment” variables turn out to be an important addition to the “efficiency>”
variables commonly specified in technology adoption models. In fact. tires for Nhorn CNC Nas technicall~
efficient ~vouldbe unlikelv to adoot the technolo~ in the absence of customer commitment. That is. those
firms ~vhichwere new auto suppliers. paid high ~~ages.had high skill at process innovation. a complex
product. and a small batch size but had no customer commitmenthod onl~ a 48% chance of adopting the
technolo~. If these firms were to be gi~en a one->ear contract b~ thclr customer. the probabiliq of odoption
Jvouldrise to 62°/0. If all variables are evaluated at their means. a six-month increase in contract !ength
produces a !7 percentage-point increase in CNC adoption. Similarly. a ten percentage-point increase in
market share produces an 11-percentagepoint increase in the rate of CNC adoption.
These results have implications for both thco~ wtd policy. On the theoretical front. the paper shous
that it is important to integrate questions of itppropriabilih into the technical change literature. in particular
b: adding supplier rchttions as a determinant of tcclmoioa adoption. Second. the paper extends transaction-
‘Wonewvertically-integrateddivisiomwwecreatedin [he 1980s.w NEW is zerowhateverVIis one.Onemightthink.
on transactwn-costgrounds.that high levelsd AUTOimdCOMPLE.Ytiouid be correlatedwith lugh Ietels ot’wet
specltici~.md thereioretvith~wlicalintegration.
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cost analysis. b~ rela..ing the assumption that agents’privite maximizing behavior ~vdl al~vays produce
orgmmtional forms that maximize social efticienc} M \\ei].
This paper has found tlvo hTes of customerlsupplier relationships that enhance the adoption of
capital-intensl~e imovations. First. market power helps to ensure appropriabili~. ixen on atomlsuc markets.
by reducing customers’ abilit? to exit from a supplie~s. Second. active commitment by indit Idual customers.
either in the form of trust}~orthybeha~lor or Iong-termcontracts. allows suppliers to plan on haJ mg the high
capacih utilization needed to cover CNC’Shigher fixed costs. Even though CNC is a general-purpose
technolo~ in the abstract. it becomes a specific asset when adopted by a firm whose sales are limlted to a fe~v
customers. since it adds to the firm’ssunk costs. Therefore, explicit commitments from customers can
increase the expected return on such an imestment by reducing the risk of a hold-up.
These results have policy implications as well. The implication of an inefficiently 10MCNC adoption
rate is that US auto suppliers will have longer production runs (less ability to produce a varieh of products at
a point in time. and less ability to quickly and continuously improve products) and lower quality than they
would othenvise. This inflexibility ~villnegatively affect US suppliers to the auto indus~, In addition. Iouer
equipment irt~estment~villreduce economic growth: DeLong and Summers ( 1991) fmd that an extra 1?4 of
GNP in~estcd in equipment is associated \\ith increased G.P. growth of.3 percentage points. They estimate
that the social rate of return on equipment investment in well-fimctioning market economies is on the order of
300/0per year.
One implication of the foregoing analysis is that a customer fro’s purchasing policies have long-
wm effects. By infhencing the incentives of the supplier base to invest in new technologies. these policies
affect customers’ ability to c~ out their strategies--and thereby, national competitiveness.
:<![lWl]llamsonlan ]anWage ( [985 ~, 195), ~ ~utom~m who specfies tie me of a partwhich can be made only by a
t~tt wqq-diershas created a hostage, a “separate but concurrent investment in spectiic assets” which bidanccs the supplier’s
mtewnentintie dedicatedassetd CNC. Furadditionalempiricalevidence on tlus issue of “dependence balancing”. see
He]de m.t John. 1988
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The results also suggest that technical progressivi~ is not a matter of having !arge firms or small
firms. as the debate has typicall} been framed. The key is to hm e connected firms. firms that work Iilth and
make clear commitments to their suppliers and customers.’6 Thcrct’ore.e~fortsto encourage tirms to adopt
capital-intcnslte technolog should not focus solely on mdi~[dual th-r-nsin isolatlon: they should in~olte a
firm’s customers as well. That is. it is important to understand backu ard md fonvard Iin.hgcs IHirschrnan.
1950) not just among industries. but bet~veenparticular firms.
“For example.a $25 million titm l~itha four-year contrac[ has almost M high a probability of adopting CNC as a S250
million tirm t~ltha one-year contract.
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Table 1. Variable Dwcriptions
CO,MPLEX
SALES
HIWAGE
[)EFINITIoiV
= 1 if business unit used computer numerical conlr(~l in 1989
= Oif CNC is appiicahie [o producing business unil”s typical product. hut
was not adopted in i989
= missing otherwise
= i if business unit rates itself as above avcr~ge In its industq In
introducing new processes
= Ootherwise
prwluction iot size for the business uni[’s ~piui product:
= i if iots last dle customer< i day
=2 if lots iast i-7 days
=3 if iots iilstX-Mdays
A if lots last more than30 days
= i if business unit’s typical product is iligiliy compiex (=5 on original
5-point scale)
= Ootherwise
= 1 if firm’s annual saies are iess than S4 miiiion
= ~ if saies we s4.25 miilion
= 3 if sales are S26-100 miliion
= 4 if sales are S101-500 million
= 5 if sales are S500million to S1 biilion
= 6 if sales are greater than S1 billion
= 1 if wages and benefitsfor productionfv(wkers wiw make the t}~iual
product are grexer than ur equal toaverage for respondents industry
= Ootherwise
Iwfl/.~(>!p
AI-TO =percentof firm’s saies that endup as original equipment for automobiles
or iight tmcks
SH-+RE = iwsiness unit”s U.S. marketshare for product iine
tls \rarl&
CO,NTRA~ = iength of contract (in yearsIwith automaker for the product/6
rli.ION(IP,. rofif ,. ~.
CRbA
Lt!J
= i + Customer’s maximum return on assets. i970-W
CROASQ = LCROA) squared
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics -
CNC
CONTRACT
NEW
HISKILL
COMPLEX
BATCH
SALES
SHARE
AUTO
CROA
CROASQ
N = 305
0.75738
0.66393
0.35738
0.50492
0.1541
2.39(!2
3.5738
0.64543
0.9071
1.4053
1.9754
SlsLcw
0.42937
0.19843
0.48001
0,5008
0.36164
0.74022
I .4288
0.24141
0.27125
0.097177
0.26316
Coluanl
NEW
t USXU
BAICM
CC3MPLEX
SALES
NIWAGE
SI iA7tE
AIJIO
CR(3A
cRcMxa
CC3NIR4CT iEsTl
LnaL
OUQ Val
coNrRAcT
rAwhod 4X.5
-19179””
025613 “
Olnwl
, 006523
0 2573T
O 1651M ““”
.00s202
o 623?3“
o 027S33
32122 ““
-t22s ““”
o I(N353
l4tt
o 13?6
o I*
o 0s714
o 16?s
004663
01647
02167
02661
124s
46\3
2
slluclulal Model
t3LTI VaI CNC
MalMd P{-
.076$IS
043797 ““
061642 ““”
.011261
0 S3274““”
o 26s62““
03453I
0917?6 ““
.,*...
05683
0192
01919
01359
03522
00741
0 2S63
03403
0 34s6
037675 ““” 0174 .
12523
3
WduCed f0$0)
rkp Val CNC
Molbd PIdJ14
I3252
0 5W05 ““
O 476S4 ““
.01223
0 Mm . ..
02773? .“”
044561 “
I 3226 ““-
-1 723I .“-
1901
66039
13259
1122
0 V451
01093
0 IX-73
0331
007286
02462
03685
03952
IG 52
6005
4
unit COOIL 10!
Rudwed Fotm
thy) V.11 CNC
Mahod PI 04M
rallwls.
34781
0133011 ““”
012518 ““
-00321
022626 ““”
O 0?279tl ‘“”
0117u2”
034113 ““”
045224 ““”
4 W1.1
I 7865
13259
Sr!LEuu
2931
00515/
004906
003425
004514
oo11131
0064?
009656
0102
4 .I16
859
I
Table 5. Nonlinear Estimation. oeP= Variabie: CNC
MidllQ GQAtiwi -
NEW
HISKILL
BATCH
COMPLEX
SALES
HIWAGE
SHARE
CONTRACT
8.704
0.005
3.0s
9.7
5.2
16.9
0.75
0.999
Qkl -143.677
